In December 2025, the European Union came unusually close to a decision that only a few years earlier would have seemed politically almost impossible: using the enormous pool of frozen Russian state assets as the basis for financing Ukraine. A proposed reparations loan could have mobilized up to €165 billion against cash balances linked to Russian sovereign assets. The deal did not happen. The EU instead agreed to raise €90 billion on capital markets for Ukraine in 2026–2027, while leaving the reparations-loan idea alive.
Current estimate: a 44% probability that by June 30, 2027 Ukraine will actually receive at least €10 billion from a new large financing mechanism created after September 7, 2026 and directly linked to frozen Russian sovereign assets or the cash balances generated by them. The probability that a political or legal decision on such a mechanism is adopted by then, but the money has not yet arrived at the required scale, is higher — around 66%. This forecast was recorded on September 7, 2026.
€210 billion exists — but that does not mean Ukraine can spend it
Roughly €210 billion in assets of the Central Bank of Russia are immobilized in the European Union. Reuters reported that around €185 billion of that amount is concentrated at Belgium-based Euroclear. Reuters
The word “frozen” can be misleading. There are at least four distinct layers: the Russian state assets themselves; income generated by the cash balances created from those assets; loans repaid with future extraordinary income from the assets; and the most radical option — a large new loan or other instrument that relies not only on interest income but on the cash balances or economic value of the frozen Russian principal itself. This forecast concerns the fourth layer.
Russian assets are already generating money for Ukraine
The debate is no longer theoretical. In early August, the European Union received another €1.4 billion in windfall profits generated by cash balances linked to Russian central-bank assets. According to the European Commission, such assets had by then generated around €8 billion in windfall profits in total. Commission
Euroclear reported that interest income from sanctioned Russian assets reached €2.3 billion in the first half of 2026. By mid-year it had already transferred about €6.6 billion through the European mechanism and expected the next contribution to be roughly €1.4 billion. Euroclear
There is a second layer as well. The G7 created roughly €45 billion in loans for Ukraine in 2024 that are intended to be serviced by future extraordinary revenues from immobilized Russian assets. The EU’s share of that structure was €18.1 billion. EU Council
So the legal threshold saying Russian assets cannot be used for Ukraine at all has already been crossed. The real fight is over the next step: whether Europe can use not only the income from the assets but also the economic value of the frozen principal.
The EU already tried once — and stepped back
That is why December 2025 matters so much. The European Commission designed a reparations-loan structure that could have delivered major financing to Ukraine without declaring a simple confiscation of Russian reserves. Ukraine would repay only once Russia paid reparations; if reparations never came, the Russian assets would remain blocked.
The European Council did not approve the scheme in December, but it formally asked for further work on the technical and legal issues. Instead, it agreed to €90 billion in conventional EU borrowing for urgent support. EU Council In January 2026, the European Commission stressed that the reparations-loan proposal had not been withdrawn. Commission
The idea therefore does not start from zero. A legal architecture has already been developed, documents exist and the political decision once came close to the finish line. That is one reason the forecast is well above the level of a remote hypothetical.
Why Ukraine has returned to the issue
The EU already has €90 billion planned for Ukraine in 2026–2027, but the need for large external financing remains. In early September, Ukraine’s Finance Ministry estimated the country’s annual external financing need at around $50 billion and the preliminarily uncovered 2027 requirement at $32.6 billion. That is a Ukrainian government estimate and can change with the budget, military spending and the course of the war. Finance Ministry
The International Monetary Fund uses a different methodology. In its July report, it estimated Ukraine’s financing gap for 2026–2029 at about $140.3 billion. IMF The two figures cannot simply be subtracted from one another, but they point in the same direction: existing packages do not eliminate Ukraine’s large external funding requirement.
That is why frozen Russian assets have returned to the table. Not only because of the argument about justice, but because of a cash requirement.
But €210 billion has a very specific address: Belgium
The strongest argument against the forecast can be summarized in one word: Euroclear. Most of the Russian reserves in Europe are tied to Belgian financial infrastructure. A political risk spread across 27 member states is therefore concentrated legally in one country and one systemically important financial institution.
Belgium worries about Russian lawsuits, counter-seizures, claims against Euroclear in third jurisdictions and a broader precedent for confidence in Europe’s financial system. In 2026, a Russian court had already ruled against Euroclear in a dispute involving the Central Bank of Russia. Euroclear does not recognize the jurisdiction of Russian courts, but the dispute itself shows that the legal risk is not abstract. Euroclear
The Bank of Russia is also challenging European legislation. In case T-331/26 it argues that provisions of an EU regulation violate principles of sovereign immunity and property rights. That is the claimant’s position, not a judgment on the merits. EUR-Lex
Ukraine is trying to change the distribution of risk
Ukraine is proposing to move legal responsibility away from Belgium and onto the European Union more broadly. Finance Minister Serhii Marchenko has argued that the risk of litigation with Russia should not remain the problem of one country and should instead be shared by all 27 EU members. Finance Ministry
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If the main obstacle is not a fundamental objection to using the assets but Belgium’s fear of carrying the consequences alone, the problem could in theory be addressed through common guarantees, a different legal structure or partial use of the assets. For now, however, this remains a negotiating path rather than an agreed solution.
Why a new loan is more plausible than direct confiscation
If Europe moves forward, the most likely structure is not a simple decision to hand €200 billion to Ukraine. That is the hardest legal option. It is more plausible to preserve Russia’s formal ownership while creating a financing instrument that lets Ukraine receive money now and pushes the final settlement onto future reparations.
The 44% forecast therefore does not mean a 44% probability of direct confiscation of Russian reserves. The chance that a large share of the principal is transferred outright by mid-2027 is much lower. The more plausible route is a legal structure in which the assets remain formally blocked but become financial backing for a new large loan to Ukraine.
History is less useful here than the sequence of policy decisions
There are too few genuinely comparable cases of a major central bank’s sovereign reserves being frozen across Western jurisdictions while those assets are considered as financing for a country still at war with the asset owner. Manufacturing a historical base rate would therefore be misleading.
The more useful evidence is the sequence since 2022: first the reserves were frozen; then the EU began using windfall profits; then the G7 created large loans repaid by those profits; then the EU explored a reparations loan tied to cash balances. The direction has mostly moved one way: from freezing toward progressively more active financial use. Each next step, however, is harder than the previous one.
Four scenarios through June 30, 2027
| Scenario | Probability | What happens |
|---|---|---|
| New reparations mechanism with large disbursements | 39% | The EU or a broader coalition approves a new large instrument linked to Russian assets; Ukraine receives at least €10 billion by the end of June. |
| Partial direct use of principal | 5% | A legal structure allows partial seizure or transfer of Russian principal; at least €10 billion reaches Ukraine. |
| A decision is made, but the money is late | 23% | A political or legal decision is adopted, but guarantees, court risks and implementation push major payments beyond the deadline. |
| No new scheme | 33% | The EU relies on already agreed financing, existing asset-income mechanisms, the IMF and other partner support. |
The first two scenarios sum to 44% and meet the YES criterion. We consider a political decision more likely than actual receipt of the required cash by mid-year.
What would raise the forecast
The strongest positive signal would be a change in Belgium’s position or a legal structure that convincingly spreads Euroclear’s financial risk across participating states. A second signal would be a new formal European Commission proposal with a specific amount, guarantees and disbursement schedule. A third would be a broad coalition including Germany, France and Italy. A fourth would be a materially larger estimate of Ukraine’s external financing gap while the war continues.
What would lower the forecast
The strongest negative signal would be a decision by key EU states that the political and financial cost of using the principal outweighs the benefit. The forecast would also fall if the €90 billion program, IMF financing and bilateral aid prove sufficient to cover most of 2027 needs, or if the frozen assets become a central bargaining chip in a real negotiation with Russia.
The question is no longer whether the assets can be used, but how far Europe will go
Income from the assets is already being used. Future income already repays loans. Russian assets remain immobilized pending compensation for Ukraine. The next threshold is therefore more concrete: will Europe turn blocked Russian capital into tens of billions of euros that Ukraine can actually use before formal reparations?
Ukraine’s funding need supports such a decision, and so does the legal work already completed. But Belgium remains a major obstacle, court disputes are already active and the current €90 billion package gives the EU room to postpone the hardest choice. As of September 7, 2026, the probability that Ukraine actually receives major new funding through such a mechanism by June 30, 2027 is estimated at 44%.
Forecast card
Forecast question: Will Ukraine receive major new financing directly linked to frozen Russian sovereign assets by June 30, 2027?
Probability: 44%. Confidence: 70/100 — moderate. Snapshot: September 7, 2026.
YES criterion: after September 7, 2026 the EU, G7 or another official coalition creates a new mechanism with an approved total size of at least €40 billion in which financing, collateral, repayment or another key financial structure is directly tied to the principal or cash balances of immobilized Russian sovereign assets; by June 30, 2027 Ukraine actually receives at least €10 billion under that new mechanism.
Excluded: G7 ERA loans already agreed before the snapshot; the existing €90 billion Ukraine Support Loan; routine windfall-profit transfers under existing mechanisms; ordinary loans or grants with no direct connection to frozen Russian assets.
NO criterion: at least one part of the YES criterion is not met by the deadline. Resolution date: July 31, 2027. Forecast history: 2026-09-07 — 44%, initial snapshot.
Disclaimer
The forecast does not claim that the event will occur. It is a current probability estimate based on information available at the forecast date and may change as new information appears.